Quality of institutions and economic growth in the MENA region
an analysis by the generalized method of moments
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.23882/rmd.23164Keywords:
Institution, economic growth, MENA region, GMMAbstract
Institutions, whether they are political, legal, financial, or administrative, provide the framework and necessary rules for a stable and prosperous economy. Strong governance, the rule of law, transparency, and the fight against corruption are all factors that foster an environment conducive to investments, innovation, and job creation. The objective of this article is to examine the influence of institutions on the economic performance of countries in the MENA region. The study focuses on a panel of 14 countries for the period 1996-2021, using the Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) dynamic system approach proposed by Blundell and Bond (1998). The results demonstrate that institutions have a positive and significant effect on the economic growth of countries in the MENA region.
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